How the Ledger works. When a desk officer closes an article with a forward prediction, it is logged here — verbatim, with the confidence assigned at the time, the resolution condition, and the resolution date. When the date arrives, the desk scores it: correct, wrong, or unresolvable (with explanation). We do not move the goalposts. If we were wrong, we say so plainly and explain what we missed.
10
Open
2
Correct
0
Wrong
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Voided
Open predictions
| Prediction | Confidence | Resolves | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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OFAC will issue a follow-on designation targeting at least one Tier-1 Chinese commercial bank (ICBC, Bank of China, China Construction Bank, or Agricultural Bank of China) within 60 days of the 25 August 2026 entity-level sanctions package, as Phase 2 of the secondary sanctions campaign. Resolution: Treasury’s OFAC Federal Register notice by 24 October 2026. Confirmed if any of the four named Tier-1 institutions appears on the SDN list. Disconfirmed if no such designation is issued by that date. Basis: Bessent’s language (“financial artery”) set a benchmark the Monday entity-level package did not reach; OFAC has been conducting a legal and diplomatic review of bank-level options since at least June 2026 per sources familiar with the review calendar; entity-level packages in prior Iran sanctions cycles have frequently been followed by escalation within 60–90 days when the initial package failed to produce voluntary compliance. |
Assessed Moderate confidence |
24 Oct 2026 | Open Logged 25 Aug 2026 |
Bessent’s Monday Package Arrives Without the Red Line Sounding No. 21 Logged 25 Aug 2026 |
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China will not materially reduce Iranian oil purchases within 90 days of Bessent’s 25 August 2026 sanctions announcement, regardless of its scope, because domestic refinery economics and strategic reserve incentives outweigh the secondary sanctions threat at current enforcement levels. Resolution: IEA, OPEC, or Reuters trade-flow data after 24 November 2026 showing Chinese crude imports from Iran in September–November 2026. A >15% month-on-month reduction in Iranian crude deliveries to China confirms; flat or rising deliveries disconfirm. Basis: China has maintained Iranian crude purchases despite prior secondary sanctions rounds (2018–2021); CIPS and yuan-settlement infrastructure reduces dollar-system exposure; domestic refinery economics and strategic reserve filling create structural demand irrespective of designation. |
Assessed Moderate confidence |
24 Nov 2026 | Open Logged 24 Aug 2026 |
The Real Target of Washington’s Iran Sanctions Is Not Tehran Sounding No. 20 Logged 24 Aug 2026 |
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The 25 August 2026 sanctions announcement will not include the designation of a major Chinese financial institution (ICBC, Bank of China, or China CITIC Bank). If it does not, the “toughest in history” characterisation will be assessed by counterparties as calibrated bluff rather than maximal enforcement, reducing deterrent value. Resolution: the official Treasury press conference and OFAC designation list published 25 August 2026. Confirmed if no major Chinese bank is listed; disconfirmed if ICBC, Bank of China, or CITIC appears on the designation. Basis: Washington has repeatedly stopped short of targeting major Chinese banks financing Iranian oil trade, citing systemic risk to bilateral financial relations; the historical pattern (2018–2021 and 2022–2025) shows enforcement against smaller intermediaries, not systemically important institutions. |
Assessed Low confidence |
26 Aug 2026 | Correct Resolved 25 Aug 2026 |
The Real Target of Washington’s Iran Sanctions Is Not Tehran Sounding No. 20 Logged 24 Aug 2026. Resolved correct 25 Aug 2026: Monday OFAC package designated 37 entities — no Tier-1 Chinese bank listed. See Sounding No. 21 follow-up. |
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Romania invokes NATO Article 4 consultations before year’s end (31 December 2026) even absent a fatality or a confirmed direct hit on Neptun Deep infrastructure itself — i.e. on the strength of repeated drone approaches alone, without a more severe triggering event. Resolution event: a formal Romanian Article 4 consultation request at NATO before 31 Dec 2026 confirms; no such request by that date disconfirms. Basis: Romania held through a casualty-producing strike near Galați (29 May 2026) and two Neptun Deep drone approaches (11 and 20 Aug 2026) without invoking Article 4, despite Foreign Minister Țoiu naming it as an available option after the May strike — a sustained pattern of restraint that the piece assesses, at low confidence, is more likely to hold than to break absent a more severe trigger. |
Assessed Low confidence |
31 Dec 2026 | Open On track |
Romania's Drone War Has Found Europe's Newest Gas Field Sounding No. 19 Logged 22 Aug 2026 |
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The Iran–Oman bilateral shipping arrangement is formally signed before the June MOU's 60-day window closes (before 19 August 2026), with Iran nominally administering the northern lane under Omani guarantee; the United States does not formally endorse the arrangement as drafted, rejecting the clause barring US- and Israeli-flagged vessels; commercial shipping for non-US, non-Israeli-flagged vessels resumes under the southern (Omani) lane within thirty days of signing while the northern lane remains effectively suspended — a de facto partial reopening, not a US-sanctioned free-passage restoration. Resolution event: a Bloomberg, Reuters, or AP report after 19 Aug 2026 confirming either (a) a US-endorsed trilateral Hormuz governance deal was formally signed — which disproves the assessment — or (b) shipping resumed under a bilateral Iran–Oman framework without formal US endorsement — which confirms it. Basis: Iran–Oman deal reported in “final drafting” (Fortune, Bloomberg, 5–7 Aug 2026); categorical US public rejection of the vessel-exclusion clause (NPR, 7 Aug; Al Jazeera, 6 Aug); Oman's independent control of the southern lane. |
Assessed (no numeric probability logged at source) |
19 Aug 2026 | Open On track |
The Strait as Lever Sounding No. 8 Logged 9 Aug 2026 |
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At the September 2026 FOMC meeting, at least two of the three July dissenters — Hammack, Kashkari, or Logan — again vote for a rate increase, sustaining the internal fracture for a second consecutive meeting, regardless of whether the hike carries. Resolution: the September 2026 FOMC statement voting record, published at federalreserve.gov. Fails if fewer than two of the three vote for a hike. Basis: ING Economics notes the three have held a coherent hawkish posture since ~April 2026, voting as a bloc; core PCE at 3.3% (June 2026, BEA) is not falling fast enough to reverse their analysis; Chair Warsh's “judgment” framing leaves the majority contestable. |
Assessed (no numeric probability logged at source) |
Sep 2026 | Open On track |
When the Instrument Breaks Sounding No. 8 Logged 9 Aug 2026 |
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The European Commission formally tables or endorses a public-private EU natural-catastrophe backstop — a reinsurance pool and/or an EU disaster fund along EIOPA's two-pillar lines — on or before 31 December 2028. Resolution: Confirmed if a European Commission legislative proposal, or Council conclusions endorsing such a facility, appears on or before 31 Dec 2028; disconfirmed if none has by that date. Basis: EIOPA's two-pillar proposal and 2026 protection-gap analysis; the ECB/EIOPA finding that only ~25% of 1980–2024 European climate-catastrophe losses were insured [Tier 1]. The design is published; the missing step is political enactment. |
Assessed (no numeric probability logged at source) |
31 Dec 2028 | Open On track |
When the Insurer Leaves Sounding No. 8 Logged 9 Aug 2026 |
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The Department of Justice does not obtain a criminal contempt conviction against Anthony Fauci arising from this referral — through declination, non-prosecution, or dismissal — within twelve months (by 9 August 2027). Resolution: a DOJ charging decision, a declination, or a court ruling on or before 9 Aug 2027. Basis: DOJ's declination on the analogous Lois Lerner waiver theory (STAT News); the absence of successful federal contempt convictions for Fifth Amendment invocation (CRS); named-specialist assessment of a strong motion to dismiss (TIME). |
Assessed (no numeric probability logged at source) |
9 Aug 2027 | Open On track |
When the Referral Is the Precedent Sounding No. 8 Logged 9 Aug 2026 |
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Iran nuclear MOU fails to convert to a full framework agreement by 31 August 2026. Resolves YES if no full framework agreement is signed by 31 Aug 2026; NO if a full framework is signed by then. The June 2026 MOU is the baseline: its 60-day frame expires around 16–18 Aug 2026 (per the source analysis), and 31 Aug is set as an end-of-month cutoff allowing for a framework signed shortly after any lapse. Escalation monitor: the US–Iran Hormuz tanker exchanges through 3 Aug have moved this toward YES. |
Assessed — ~70% (raised from 60% at logging; Hormuz escalation reduces conversion probability) |
31 Aug 2026 | Open On track |
Iran deal analysis Sounding No. 2 Logged 3 Aug 2026. Date note: MOU signed June 2026, not July as originally logged. Resolution wording corrected 4 Aug 2026: prior "within 60 days of signing" framing conflicted with the source MOU's ~16–18 Aug expiry; the 31 Aug resolution date is unchanged. |
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China Coast Guard patrols east of Taiwan increase in cadence or harden toward continuous station-keeping by 3 February 2027. Resolves YES if documented monthly CCG presence east of Taiwan rises above the June–August 2026 baseline, or open reporting confirms continuous/near-continuous station-keeping east of the island. Resolves NO if eastern patrols become sporadic below the summer-2026 rate or stop. Escalation watch: any confirmed CCG–PLA Navy joint operation east of Taiwan is a separate, higher-severity marker and triggers a follow-up piece regardless of cadence resolution. |
Assessed — ~60% | 3 Feb 2027 | Open On track. Patrols intensifying (late July). US State Dept: "deeply destabilizing" (3 Aug). |
Taiwan CCG analysis Sounding No. 3 Logged 4 Aug 2026 |
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The US does not invoke Section 338's product-exclusion (embargo) power against Canada before the end of Q3 2026. Resolves YES if, by 30 Sep 2026, the US has held the Section 338 action against Canada at the tariff (50%) level without invoking the statute's product-exclusion/embargo escalation — even if Canada imposes symmetric countermeasures. Resolves NO if the US invokes the exclusion clause against any Canadian goods before that date. Desk basis: barring Canadian auto goods entirely damages US assemblers more than Ottawa, so the clause holds value as a standing threat, not an action. |
Assessed (no numeric probability logged at source) |
30 Sep 2026 | Open On track — no Section 338 product-exclusion invoked as of 4 Aug 2026. |
Canada 338 tariff analysis Sounding No. 2 Logged 3 Aug 2026. Corrected 4 Aug 2026: replaces an erroneous "Poilievre wins a majority on 19 Aug 2026" entry that misread the source — the article logged this Section 338 embargo prediction, not an election call. |
Scored — correct
| Prediction | Confidence | Scored | Result | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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The 25 August 2026 sanctions announcement will not include the designation of a major Chinese financial institution (ICBC, Bank of China, or China CITIC Bank). Logged at low confidence (prediction favoured non-designation). Monday’s OFAC notice designated 37 entities across the Iranian oil circuit — petroleum traders, tanker operators, clearing intermediaries — and no Tier-1 Chinese bank. Resolved correct. Analysis of what the non-designation reveals about enforcement calibration in Sounding No. 21 flagship. |
Assessed Low confidence |
25 Aug 2026 | Correct | The Real Target of Washington’s Iran Sanctions Is Not Tehran Sounding No. 20 Logged 24 Aug 2026. Resolved 25 Aug 2026. |
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At least three major non-China economies face formal US Section 301 investigations by end of 2026. Prediction: USTR's Section 301 actions expand beyond China to at least three other major economies before 31 Dec 2026. Resolved correct: in July 2026 USTR deployed a Section 301 forced-labor action covering 60 economies (Federal Register memorandum of 23 July 2026, published 28 July 2026) — sweeping in major non-China economies far beyond the three-economy threshold — alongside a separate Section 301 action against Brazil (memorandum of 15 July 2026). Both predate the 3 Aug logging date. |
Assessed — 50% (at logging; resolved before log date) |
4 Aug 2026 (resolved earlier) |
Correct | Section 301 global analysis Sounding No. 2 Logged 3 Aug 2026. Resolution predates logging — scored on first Ledger review. Basis corrected 4 Aug 2026 to match the source: 60 economies, July 2026 (earlier draft said 16 economies / March–June 2026). |
Scored — wrong
No predictions currently scored wrong. When a logged forward call is falsified by events, it is recorded here in full — prediction, confidence at logging, and what happened — with no softening.
Voided
No predictions currently voided. A prediction is voided only when its premise was factually mis-specified at logging, leaving no live resolution mechanism — distinct from being scored wrong on an honest analytic call.
What the confidence labels mean
When the desk logs a prediction, the confidence number reflects the desk's assessed probability at the time of writing — not a certainty, not a hedge. A 65% call means the desk thinks that outcome is more likely than not. When we are wrong on a 65% call, that is not automatically an error — it is within the expected range of outcomes. When we are wrong on the premise of a call — a factual mis-specification rather than an analytic miss — that is a genuine failure of a different kind, and we void the entry and say so.
Established — confirmed by multiple independent primary sources.
Assessed — well-supported inference, clearly labelled.
Speculation — possible but unverified; always flagged.
Contact
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